The battle of Chickamauga (chik-a-ma’ga), was fought near Chickamauga Creek’ and on Georgia soil, 19-20 September 1863. Gen. Rosecrans forced Gen. Braxton Bragg out of his fortified Middle Tennessee position by a strategy campaign, prepared to take control of Chattanooga. The gateway through the mountains to the Gulf States, and a major railroad center for the Confederacy.
Gen. Braxton Bragg held the city, beyond the Cumberland Mountains and the Tennessee River. On the western side of the Cumberland’s army, General William Rosecrans’ army was positioned. His headquarters were at Winchester, Tenn. His army was composed of three infantry corps, the Fourteenth, Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas; and the Twentieth, Gen. Alex. McD. McCook; and the Twenty-first, Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden. Gen. D. S. Stanley commanded one cavalry corps.
As for McCook’s corps, it was the right wing, Thomas’s was the center, and Crittenden’s was the left wing. Stanley’s cavalry guarded the right flank, and Minty’s cavalry brigade the left. The plan of the campaign involved the repair of the railroad to the Tennessee River, supplies for a month’s absence from any base, and ammunition for two battles. It also included throwing Rosecran’s army to the rear of Chattanooga and advancing from the south. His center and right ascend Lookout before Bragg realized the movement’s character.
He then evacuated Chattanooga and moved to La Fayette, 26 miles south and behind Pigeon Mountain, the next range east of Lookout. He left his rearguard just below Lee and Gordon’s Mill at the Chickamauga crossing. Crittenden having accomplished his purpose north of the Tennessee, withdrew through Sequatchee Valley to the river. He crossed both that and the Sand Mountains, and entered Lookout Valley near Lookout Mountain’s north point.
A reconnoitering party, on 9 September, discovered the city’s evacuation. Passing around the mountain point, Crittenden, leaving one brigade in the city, proceeded immediately through Rossville Gap to operate to the left of Thomas. Thomas had descended Lookout at Stevens’ Gap. McCook was further to the right, crossing Lookout at Winston’s. The grand strategy of the campaign was successful. The army had been thrown over three formidable mountain ranges and a wide river, all within Gen. Bragg’s immediate territory, without opposition, almost without discovery, and entirely without loss.
To capture Chattanooga, it was necessary to concentrate the widely separated corps in it, or between it and Bragg. Erroneous dispatches led Rosecrans to believe Bragg was retreating. He ordered pursuit and found Bragg occupying Pigeon Mountain gaps in force and preparing movements against each separate corps. These failed, and Bragg, knowing the arrival of Longstreet, with two divisions from the Army of Northern Virginia, issued, on 18 September, orders of battle designed for interposing between the Union army and the city.
At this time the main bodies of the two armies confronted each other across the upper Chickamauga, and Longstreet was arriving at Ringgold. Crittenden’s corps was concentrated at Lee and Gordon’s mill. During the afternoon of the 18th Gen. Bushrod Johnson from Ringgold, in command of five brigades, including Hood’s division of Longstreet’s corps, forced a crossing at Reed’s Bridge.
This was after a sharp defense by Minty’s cavalry. Walker’s corps, after failing at Alexander’s Bridge, defended by Wilder’s mounted infantry brigade, crossed at a ford below. During the night about two-thirds of Bragg’s army crossed the Chickamauga, and early in the morning of the 19th he formed a line of battle directly on Crittenden’s left flank and was in close contact with it.
Bragg’s plan was to drive Crittenden’s corps hack on Thomas in the center, and both on McCook on the right. He would force the entire area to the mountains. His battle plan was interfered with and finally destroyed by an undiscovered night advance by Rosecrans’ center and right. Rosecrans passed several miles beyond Bragg’s position and thrust his lines across the La Fayette Road and eastward to the Chickamauga. He was offered a position between Bragg and Chattanooga.
Thomas’ corps, which struck Forrest’s cavalry at Jay’s Mill, was Brannan’s. The fighting became desperate and at close quarters, and continued until 1 o’clock, when Forrest and his supporters were repulsed. Soon both armies advanced toward this vortex of fierce fighting. It was desperate on both sides, continuing from noon until sunset, with alternate victories and defeats for each side, the field finally remaining in Union hands. The deadly fighting throughout the day was largely in forests thick with underbrush, all within point-blank range.
At nightfall, Cleburne’s division burst with overwhelming force upon Johnson’s and Baird’s divisions. These divisions were well ahead of the center. After dark, they gradually withdrew from under the fire. At the close of the day’s fighting, Rosecrans’ army held La Fayette Road between Bragg and Chattanooga. Bragg’s battle plan for the day had been defeated. On the Union side the entire force except five brigades had been engaged. Of Bragg’s army three divisions and one brigade still had not been engaged, and two brigades did not arrive until the second day.
At the close of the first day’s battle, the Confederate line extended from Hall’s Ford to Jay’s Mill. The Union line was brought back nearer to La Fayette Road, which was the axis and objective of the battle. The Confederate line extended far beyond the Union left. Counting by brigades, the Union line was overlapped on its left by four cavalry brigades, two fighting dismounted, and two brigades of infantry. On its right, two brigades of infantry. The Confederates had 15 brigades in their reserves, counting Longstreet’s second and third lines, Law’s and Kershaw’s divisions, in the center. The Union army had five brigades, an overlap with the Confederates of four brigades, and an excess of 10 in the reserves.
Logs, stumps, stones, and fence rails had reinforced the Union line’s front. Counting by divisions from left to right, it was formed as follows: Baird, Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds east of the La Fayette road; Brannan, Negley, Davis, Sheridan, and Wilder’s Mounted Brigade west of it, with Wood and Van Cleve in reserve. The Confederate line, from right to left, consisted of Pegram and Armstrong of Forrest’s cavalry.
It also consisted of Breckenridge, Cleburne, Stewart, Bushrod Johnson, Hindman, and Preston. In reserve were Walker, Liddell, Cheatham, Law, and Kershaw in reserve. The Confederates attacked about 9 o’clock, Breckenridge moving against Baird, the left brigade. He struck Baird’s rude works, breaking them and its commander, and mortally wounded. The other two brigades swung around full on the Union rear but were driven back after sharp fighting. Cleburne and Stewart were assaulted in succession and did not survive.
At 11 o’clock Negley, in the rear of the Brotherton house, had been replaced by Wood from the reserve and sent to the left. Brannan, on Wood’s left, had also been ordered to the left. However, with the Confederate attack developing on his front, he did not move. Upon learning he had disappeared, Wood was ordered to close down Reynolds, a division to the left of Brannan. Wood moved quickly to find Reynolds. This left a gap, just as Longstreet, with a column of three divisions, Bushrod and Johnson in the front line, Law in the second, and Kershaw in the third, attacked Wood’s position. This broke the Union center.
Davis’ and Sheridan’s divisions to the right of the break rushed toward the gap but failed to restore the line. Being attacked in front and on both flanks by Johnson’s and Hindman’s troops, they were forced off the field in confusion. Rosecrans, Crittenden, and McCook being on the right wing, were driven off the field with that portion of the army which left it. Brannan’s division, the first on the left of the break, swung back nearly at right angles and took position on Snodgrass Hill, a quarter of a mile in the rear, on which also rallied other portions of the Union army that had been scattered or broken.
At noon Forrest’s cavalry, opposite Cloud’s, had crossed La Fayette Road and captured the field hospitals of the Union left wing. The four divisions of Baird, Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds maintained their lines around Kelly Field. At 1 o’clock Gen. Thomas had formed parts of Brannan’s, Wood’s, and Negley’s divisions, with various fragments, on Snodgrass Hill. Negley left at noon with two infantry regiments and 40 guns. Gen. Thomas then had only one battery. At about 11:30 the hill was encircled by five brigades, Fulton’s overlapping Brannan’s right and gaining the valley in his rear.
At this juncture, Gordon Granger arrived at McAfee’s Church with Whitaker and Mitchell’s brigades of Steedman’s division. Granger attacked immediately and drove the Confederate forces that crossed the ridge over it again. He extended Gen. Thomas’ line for a half mile along the crest. At about the same time, Van Derveer’s strong brigade arrived from its successful charge on Breckenridge in Kelly Field and strengthened Brannan’s line. Longstreet’s assault continued with barely any intermission until sundown, all of courageous character.
Finally, 11 Confederate brigades participated in Snodgrass’ attack. For its defense, Thomas had five brigades and about one-half of two others. There was little fighting on the Kelly Field line after 1 o’clock, though Bragg ordered a general attack at 3. It was not delivered until about dusk. At 3 Longstreet, from Snodgrass Hill, asked Bragg for reinforcements, but was informed that the right wing had been so beaten back that it could be of no service to him. Longstreet’s last assault was on troops not been engaged.
Their attack began at 4:30 and lasted until 6. They gained a salient on the Union line and held it for an hour, losing 36 percent. However, they were finally dislodged by Gen. Charles H. Grosvenor’s regiment. At 5.30 Gen. Thomas withdrew his army. The four divisions on Kelly Field retired from right to left. Reynolds and Palmer were not attacked. The Confederate attack ordered at 3 o’clock was delivered just as Johnson and Baird left their lines. Some captures were made, though both reached the forest west of La Fayette Road without disorganization. They followed the rest of the right wing through McFarland’s Gap to Rossville.
At 7 o’clock the Snodgrass Hill line began to retire from left to right. Steedman withdrew at 6 sundown. Fighting had ceased. An hour later Trigg and Kelly, passing over the ground Steedman had occupied, captured the majority part of three Union regiments temporarily attached to the left of his line. They accidentally missed the withdrawal.
The last volley of the battle was fired by troops of Van Derveer’s brigade at Kelly’s and Trigg’s lines. After capturing the isolated troops, they attempted to move to Van Derveer’s position. Davis’ division, which had been cut off at noon, reached a point on its return near Gen. Thomas’ right at sundown. Gen. Sheridan, who had continued to Rossville, marched toward the field from that point, reaching Cloud’s an hour after sundown.
Both divisions supported the flanks, while troops were withdrawn. Gen. Thomas withdrew the army without molestation through McFarland’s Gap to Rossville. During the night, it was placed in a strong position in the gap at Rossville. It was also along the adjacent crest of Missionary Ridge and across the valley to Lookout Mountain. It was thus firmly established between Bragg and Chattanooga. Holding his lines the next day, he retreated toward Chattanooga. Gen. Rosecrans crossed Tennessee with an effective force of 55,000. Therefore, two brigades and an additional regiment were detached. The maximum figure for his force at the battle opening would be 50,000.
It is difficult to approximate Bragg’s forces. A week after the battle he reported 38,846 effects, and his losses were 18,000, which would make his force in action 56,846. Gen. R. E. Lee, writing to President Davis of Bragg’s strength, five days before the battle, said: (His total effective force will therefore be 76,219 as large a number as I suppose he can operate with counting Longstreet’s re-enforcement, according to Gen. Lee’s figures, but a large part of Longstreet’s forces never reached Bragg. In view of Gen Lee’s statements, the known overlapping of the Union lines, and the preponderance of his reserves, it would seem that Bragg’s force can be fairly fixed at 55,000.
Few, if any, of the great battles of the war show an equal percentage of casualties, considering the numbers engaged and the time of fighting. The losses for killed wounded and missing for Rosecrans were 16,179, and for Bragg 18,000. For the troops actually engaged these figures give a percentage of 33 percent for each side. On the Confederate side, Longstreet’s wing lost 44 percent, nearly all on the second day.
Bushrod Johnson’s division lost 44 percent, Preston’s 33 percent in the attack of an hour and a half on Snodgrass Hill; and Grade’s brigade of the latter division suffered 36 percent during the same time. Cheatham’s division suffered brigade losses from 35 to 50 percent. Breckinridge lost 33 percent and Cleburne 43 percent. Bates’ brigade of Stewart’s division lost 52 percent. The Confederates assaulted throughout the second day.
On the Union side, Steedman’s division lost 49 percent in four hours, and all were killed or wounded but one. Brannan’s division lost slightly over 36 percent; Van Derveer’s division lost less than 50 percent; Davis’ division a little over 50 percent; Van Cleve’s division 23.5 percent. Among the Union brigades Buell’s loss was 45 percent, Carlin’s 53 percent, Hazen’s 34 percent, Dick’s 25 percent, Connell’s 37 percent, and Croxton’s 39 percent. On 22 September Bragg began to establish his lines before Chattanooga and prepare for driving or starving the Union army out of them.
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